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Abstract: The potential importance of fiscal policy in influencing inflation has recently been highlighted, 
following Woodford (1995), under the heading of the ‘Fiscal Theory of the Price Level’ (FTPL). Some 
authors have suggested that this theory provides a rationale for the Pact for Stability and Growth as a 
necessary condition for the ECB pursuing a policy of price stability. In this paper, we relax the assumptions 
underpinning the FTPL by developing a two country open economy model, where each country has 
overlapping generations of non-Ricardian consumers who supply labour to imperfectly competitive firms 
which can only change their prices infrequently. We examine the case where the two countries have formed 
a monetary union, but where the fiscal authorities remain independent. We show that the fiscal response 
required to ensure stability of the real debt stock is greater when consumers are not infinitely lived. In 
principle, this allows for some compensating behaviour between governments, but we show that the scope 
for compensation is small The monetary authority can abandon its active targeting of inflation to stabilise 
the debt of at most one fiscal authority, and any other combination of policies will either result in price level 
indeterminacy and/or indefinite transfers of wealth between the two economies. Finally, in a series of 
simulations we show that fiscal shocks have limited impact on output and inflation provided the fiscal 
authorities meet the (weak) requirements of fiscal solvency. However, when monetary policy is forced to 
abandon its active targeting of inflation, then fiscal shocks have a much greater impact on both output and 
inflation.  
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Introduction 
 
  Following Woodford (1995) a literature has developed under the heading of the ‘Fiscal 
Theory of the Price Level’
2. Under certain conditions
3 the economy is in one of two regimes - a 
‘Ricardian’ regime where the fiscal authorities act prudently, government debt does not constitute 
an element of net wealth and monetary policy is free to target inflation, and another, ‘non-
Ricardian’ regime, where fiscal insolvency requires surprise inflation to deflate the nominal value 
of government debt, irrespective of the stance of monetary policy. In earlier work (Leith and 
Wren-Lewis (2000)) we relaxed a number of assumptions underlying the FTPL, by considering a 
closed economy with overlapping generations of consumers supplying labour to imperfectly 
competitive firms which could only adjust their prices infrequently. This economy also had two 
stable policy regimes: one where the fiscal authorities stabilised their debt stocks and monetary 
policy was ‘active’ (using the terminology of Leeper (1991)), such that the authorities raised real 
interest rates when inflation was above target, and another where fiscal instability forced the 
monetary authorities to react ‘passively’ to inflation by not raising real interest rates. However 
both monetary and fiscal policy affected inflation under both regimes, and, additionally, both 
regimes could occur even if all government debt was indexed. 
The FTPL has also been extended to the open economy in a number of papers
4. In 
Woodford (1998) the extension to the case of a monetary union is straightforward in that under the 
assumptions of the fiscal theory, with the additional simplifying assumption of international risk 
sharing, considering two countries operating under monetary union simply aggregates the budget 
constraints of the two countries into a single constraint. Therefore, if one fiscal authority makes no 
attempt to adjust future surpluses to ensure solvency then another member state can run sufficient 
surpluses to compensate for this in terms of the aggregate budget constraint. Essentially, the 
government of the prudent country buys the debt of the profligate country. When the assumption 
of international risk sharing is dropped (as in Bergin(2000)), the conclusion that it is only the 
aggregate budget constraint that determines whether we are in a ‘Ricardian’ or ‘non-Ricardian’ 
                                                                 
2 For a comprehensive survey of the FTPL see Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) or Woodford (2001). 
3 The Fiscal Theory assumes that the real level of tax revenues and spending are exogenous such that the 
fiscal authorities do not adjust real surpluses to ensure their budget constraint is satisfied in the face of 
negative fiscal shocks (i.e. fiscal policy is ‘active’ in the sense of Leeper (1991). It is also assumed that all 
real seigniorage revenues are repaid to consumers. The description of the economy is completed with the 
introduction of an infinitely lived yeoman farmer and as a result the ex ante real interest rate is identical to 
the representative agent’s rate of time preference, and is unaffected by monetary and fiscal policy. Under 
these conditions, the government’s finances are insulated from the effects of monetary policy and, when 
prices are flexible, the price level adjusts to satisfy the government’s budget constraint.  
4 Dupor (2000), Daniel (2001) and Loyo (1998) consider the fiscal theory in the context of two open 
economies operating under flexible exchange rates, and seek to address the question as to whether or not the 
FTPL can deliver a determinate nominal exchange rate and price levels in the two economies. Woodford 
(1998), Bergin (2000) and Sims (1997) consider the case of open economies which have entered into a   2 
regime (Woodford (1998)) still holds, but the prudent government will be transferring the wealth 
of its citizens abroad and thereby reducing their consumption relative to consumers in the 
profligate economy. Therefore, it is suggested (see for example, Sims (1999)) that if one member 
state does not act to stabilise the debt stock, then it is unlikely that other member states will act to 
compensate this behaviour, and we will find ourselves operating in the world of the FTPL.  
  In this paper, section 1, develops a two country open economy model, where - unlike the 
FTPL
5 - each country has overlapping generations of consumers who supply labour to imperfectly 
competitive firms which can only change their prices infrequently. Consumers in each country 
purchase goods produced both at home and abroad. We examine the case where the two countries 
have formed a monetary union, but where the fiscal authorities remain independent. Canzoneri et 
al (2001) conjecture that extensions of this kind may be crucial in determining the plausibility of 
sustainable non-Ricardian regimes in the real world. Our analysis confirms this conjecture. 
Section 2 analyses the restrictions on monetary and fiscal policy necessary to reach a unique 
saddlepath-stable rational expectations solution which does not involve indefinite transfers of 
wealth from the consumers of one economy to the consumers of the other. Section 3 then 
calibrates the model and compares the macroeconomic consequences of a fiscal shock under the 
various policy regimes identified in section 2. Section 4 concludes. 
 
1.A Two-Country Model under EMU. 
 
The Consumer’s Problem: 
 
A typical home consumer, i, derives utility from consuming a basket of consumption 
goods,
i










t N , We assume that consumers face a constant instantaneous probability of death, k, 
and can pool the risks associated with the variations in labour supply that arise from staggered 












=++--+- ￿   (1) 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
monetary union with a fixed nominal exchange rate and common monetary policy, but which still operate 
independent fiscal policies. 
5 Woodford (1998), also relaxes the assumption of flexible prices, but retains the assumption of infinitely 
lived consumers.  
6 This specification is similar in terms of functional form to Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998), although we 
abandon the assumption of infinitely lived consumers and allow consumers to supply labour to firms rather 
than act as yeoman-farmers.     3 
 
where s is the individual’s rate of time preference and the basket of consumption goods is defined 
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Since there are assumed to be no impediments to trade, the law of one price holds for each 
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where p(z) is the home currency price of good z, p*(z) is the foreign currency price of good z and 
e is the nominal exchange rate, which we can normalise to a fixed nominal value of 1 under 
monetary union. 
The consumer can hold her financial wealth in the form of domestic government bonds, 
Dt, foreign bonds,  Ft, and money balances,  Mt. Due to international arbitrage, domestic and 
foreign bonds earn the same nominal return, Rt, while domestic consumers receive a share in the 
profits of domestic firms,  t P . It is assumed that the consumer receives a premium from perfectly 
competitive insurance companies in return for their financial assets, including money, should they 
die. This effectively raises the rate of return from holding financial assets by k. Consumer’s pay 
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where A
i
t represents consumer i’s financial assets and  t r is the ex ante real interest rate.  
The parameter  l  measures the proportion of debt which is nominal. Therefore, 
when 0 l = all interest-bearing financial wealth is fully indexed such that the ex post real interest 
rate enjoyed by holders of the financial asset is equivalent to the ex ante real interest rate. When 
1 l =  all interest-bearing financial wealth is nominal and surprise inflation can erode the real 
value of financial wealth by decreasing the ex post real interest rate relative to the ex ante rate as   4 
under the Fiscal Theory. In our policy simulations we shall assume that the economy was initially 
in steady-state before an unanticipated shock moves the economy away from this steady-state. We 
shall then track the response of the economy to this shock under different descriptions of 
monetary and fiscal policy. As a result, when the shock hits the economy it is possible for ex ante 
real rates to differ from ex post real rates. However, for the remainder of the simulation, due to the 
pooling of risks resulting from finite lives and stochastic price setting, the economy behaves as if 
it is operating under perfect foresight. Therefore, we can drop the distinction between ex ante and 
ex post real rates in periods other than the initial period, t, in which the shock hits. The consumer 
then has to maximise utility (1) subject to her budget constraint (5) along with the usual solvency 
conditions. The various first order conditions this implies are as follows. 
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  Integrating the consumer’s Euler equation forwards and substituting into the intertemporal 
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If we normalise total population size to one, then by noting that the current size of a 
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where the aggregate financial wealth of domestic consumers is made up of their holdings of 
money, domestic bonds and foreign bonds, 
*
tttt AMDF =++. 









k -=  (12) 
 






c =   (13) 
 
In the foreign country there will be corresponding equations for labour supply, money demand 
and consumption. 
 
The Firm’s Problem: 
 
In the absence of capital and without any constraints on price setting the firm would simply 
maximise profits in each period in a static manner. However, it is assumed that firms are subject 
to the constraints implied by Calvo (1983) contracts such that at each point in time firms are able 
to change prices with a probability  a . As firms cannot adjust their prices continuously, there is an 
intertemporal dimension to the firm’s pricing/output decision. Suppose the firm is charging a 
price,  () t pz , at time t, then the discounted value of the expected profits generated over the 
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For simplicity it is assumed that the firm’s production technology is linear,  ()() tt yzNz = . The 
CES form of the utility function implies that the ith consumer’s demand for product z is given by, 
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Integrating demands across consumers and assuming that each government allocates its spending 
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where y(z), c, c*, g, and g* are defined as real per capita variables. Given the linear production 
function, the firm’s (per capita) demand for labour will be equivalent to equation (16). 
Utilising the home and foreign demands for product z, allows us to rewrite the objective 
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where  t p %  is the price chosen by such firms.  
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The home output price index, p(h) is a weighted average of the prices set in the past, 
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where  t p %  is the price set in accordance with equation (18) by those home producers that were able 
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which, given the linear production technology, means that demand for labour is obtained by 
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where the total liabilities of the government,  lt comprise government bonds held by home 
consumers, dt, or by foreign consumers, 
*
t f , and non-interest bearing money, mt. The proportion 
of debt which is nominal is given by  l . Therefore, a surprise inflation will erode the real value of 
government debt which is denominated in nominal terms. Aside from borrowing and seigniorage, 
the government finances spending by levying a lump-sum tax of  t t  on home consumers. Note that 
while our model allows for surprise inflation eroding the real value of nominal debt as in the 
FTPL, our budget constraint allows for a number of additional effects not present in the FTPL. 
Firstly, we do not assume that seigniorage revenues are automatically redistributed to consumers – 
therefore the effects contained in the ‘unpleasant monetarist arithmetic’ of Sargent and Wallace 
(1975) are potentially present in our model. Secondly, by introducing non-Ricardian consumers 
and nominal inertia, both monetary policy and fiscal policy can affect real interest rates and 
thereby, real debt service costs.   
The foreign government’s budget constraint is given by, 
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Since the nominal exchange rate is fixed and PPP holds in terms of consumer prices, the real rate 
of interest payable on government debt, defined in terms of consumer prices,  is the same in both 
countries. 
 
2.Compatibility Between Monetary and Fiscal Policy.  
 
The Steady-State and Log-Linearisation 
 
  In this section we assess the stability of our two monetary union economies. In order to do 
so we first linearise our model around a symmetrical steady-state. We also assume, for simplicity, 
that the rate of inflation in our steady-state is zero, so that the mis-pricing due to overlapping 
contracts will not exist in steady-state. Equation (18) shows that the optimal price in steady-state, 
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Combining this with the labour supply condition, the production function and the national 
accounting identity (in the symmetrical steady-state the current account will be in balance so that 
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Note that in this symmetrical equilibrium, with PPP due to free trade, it will also be the case that 
the real value of debt held overseas will be the same in both  countries, 
* FF
P P
= . This fact, 
combined with equations (26)-(29), will determine the steady-state value of real assets in the 
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Since consumers are not infinitely lived, the real interest rate is not identical to consumers’ rate of 
time preference, but will be affected by the outstanding stock of government liabilities, since these 
liabilities constitute consumers’ net wealth. 
  Appendix 1 details the log-linearisation of the model around this steady-state, such that 
our two-country model can be described by the following equations. Firstly, the staggered price 
setting behaviour of our imperfectly competitive firms generates an open economy version of the 
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In standard closed-economy formulations of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, current excess 
inflation is related to expected future output gaps as firms, which can only renegotiate price 
contracts at random intervals, raise prices now in anticipation of workers demanding higher wages 
to supply the labour required to produce higher output in the future. Our model reflects the same 
basic mechanism, but recognises that workers’ desire to consume more includes not only 
consumer goods, but also leisure. Therefore, the wage increases required to secure more labour to 
increase production are greater when that production goes to satisfy an increase in domestic 
consumption, rather than increased government purchases or foreign consumption. These effects 
explain the differential impacts of domestic consumption, domestic output and foreign output on 
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  The demand curve derived from the CES utility function implies the following definition 
of average home firm output, 
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and average foreign firm output, 
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The path for consumption in each economy follows the Euler equation, which for the home 
country is, 
 







=+-+++-+   (35)  
 











=+-+++-+   (36)  
 
These are the usual consumption Euler equations, adjusted for holdings of money balances and 
allowing for the possibility that finites lives mean that government debt constitutes an element in 
net wealth. Note that when  0 k = , consumers live forever and the level of government debt has no 
impact on consumption. 
  Given these optimal paths for consumption, the private sector’s assets will evolve 
according to,  
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   11 
In this open economy model, private wealth in one country is not synonymous with the level of 
public sector liabilities in that country. Any increase in the level of the financial wealth of the 
private sector relative to the liabilities of the government implies an increase in holdings of 
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and for the foreign government,  
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and, secondly, for the asset market, 
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In describing policy we assume that the monetary and fiscal authorities implement simple 
rules. This allows us to obtain tractable results despite the underlying complexity of the model. It 
also allows us to make clear comparisons with other studies in the literature which have utilised 
these simple rules (see, for example, Leeper (1991), Woodford (1998) and Sims (1997)). We 
assume that the common monetary policy involves setting real interest rates to target inflation so 
that, tt rrm p =+ , which implies 
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   12 
Due to the equality of real rates across the economies and the existence of PPP in consumer 
prices, this is consistent with a monetary policy which sets European interest rates to target 
Europe-wide consumer (or output) price inflation.  
Now suppose fiscal policy acts to stabilise the liabilities of each fiscal authority 
independently. We follow Sims (1997) in formulating a simple rule as follows,  
 
  1 tot l tff =+   (44) 
 
This rule can be log-linearised as,  
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in the foreign economy. 
 
Necessary Conditions for Saddle-Path Stability: 
 
We now analyse the necessary conditions for saddle-path stability in our model, in an 
attempt to discover any tensions/interactions in the setting of monetary and fiscal policy within 
our two-country model. Before doing so it is helpful to discuss why analysing policy 
configurations which are consistent with rational expectations equilibria without implying 
indefinite transfers of wealth between member states is useful. Some papers which attempt to 
apply the FTPL to EMU simply ask whether or not the price level is determined by monetary or 
fiscal policy (see Woodford (1998) for example) by examining whether or not the aggregate 
budget constraint across the monetary union places us in a Ricardian or non-Ricardian regime. 
Other authors (see for example Bergin (2000) or Sims (1997)) note that by only looking at the 
aggregate budget constraint we may observe policy configurations where there are indefinite 
transfers of wealth from the citizens of one economy to the other. For reasons of sustainability 
these authors would like to restrict fiscal policy such that one authority cannot run a no-Ponzi 
scheme against the other. In the case of the former, a multi-country model of monetary union 
allows budget constraints to be aggregated across member states such that the equilibria identified 
in closed economy applications of the FTPL will also apply. However, if we wish to restrict fiscal 
policy such that one member state does not indefinitely accumulate the debt of the other, then this   13 
will limit the set of feasible equilibria since each country’s intertemporal budget constraint 
generates an equilibrium condition which must be satisfied
7.  
In our model, it is not possible to  a priori divide policy into ‘Ricardian’ or ‘non-
Ricardian’ regimes since at all points in time monetary and fiscal policy jointly determine the 
values of real and nominal magnitudes in our economies. However, we must make a decision on 
whether or not to permit one fiscal authority to indefinitely accumulate the debt of another. If we 
were to consider this behaviour, then we too would be able to aggregate equations across our two 
economies in order to analyse the existence of global rational expectations equilibria. However, 
this model of monetary union would, in essence, be equivalent to a closed economy model of the 
sort analysed in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000) with the same restrictions on monetary and fiscal 
policy being required to ensure the existence of a saddlepath-stable rational-expectations 
equilibrium. Therefore, in this paper, we restrict fiscal policy such that one authority cannot run a 
no-Ponzi scheme on the other. Accordingly, by analysing the saddlepath stability of the dynamic 
system derived below, we can identify the identify the combinations of monetary and fiscal policy 
which will deliver a unique path for prices under rational expectations and which do not violate 
the additional restriction on fiscal policy.  
To undertake this stability analysis it is helpful to represent our economies as a dynamic 
system in matrix algebra form. This can be achieved quite easily as follows. First of all, note that 
the global market clearing conditions, allow us to eliminate one of our financial asset/liability 
variables from the system since it is determined as a residual of the other three. We choose to drop 
* ˆt a , although the choice is immaterial
8. Similarly we can eliminate 
* ˆt y  from all equations using the 
condition for market clearing in the goods market. Finally, noting that the definition of consumer 





) ))  it can be seen that home firm output (33) depends 
upon aggregate demand and the real exchange rate, which can be defined as,  ˆˆˆ ()() ttt ephpf =-. 
Therefore, any terms in domestic output can be replaced with a combination of the real exchange 
rate and the components of aggregate demand,
* ˆˆˆ ,, ttt ccg  and 
* ˆt g , although we also need to add an 
equation describing the evolution of the real exchange rate,  
 
                                                                 
7Whether or not the fiscal authorities are restricted in the accumulation of the debt of other countries is also 
crucial in ensuring determinacy of the nominal exchange rate in flexible exchange rate regimes. In the 
absence of any restriction, the two budget constraints can be aggregated into a single constraint which is 
insufficient to determine two prices levels and the nominal exchange rate. While if fiscal policy is restricted, 
the two budget constraints remain separated and the two price levels (and nominal exchange rate) are now 
fully determined. (See Canzoneri et al (2001) for a discussion of this point). 
8 In fact it is possible to represent the dynamic system in a number of ways. For example, by differentiating 
the equations for output, we can replace the dynamic equation for the real exchange rate with a dynamic 
equation for domestic output – however the underlying dynamic systems are identical and as a result so are 
the stability conditions we derive below.    14 
  ˆˆˆ ()() ttt dehf pp =-  (47) 
 
By adding the description of policy outlined above, we can represent the two economies in matrix 
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The constraints on policy required to ensure a dynamically stable economy are probably 
clearer, if we assume that the economy approaches its cashless limit
9 (as in Woodford (1998)) 
i.e.  0 c ﬁ . This has the implication that the central bank retains control over nominal interest 
rates, but that the contribution of seigniorage revenues to government finances are negligible. 
Woodford (op. cit.) shows that this cashless economy retains the essential features of the 
FTPL and this is confirmed for a closed economy with sticky prices and non-Ricardian 
consumers in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000).  
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A necessary condition for stability is that the determinant of this matrix be positive, since we 
require four eigenvalues with negative real parts (corresponding to the pre-determined 
variables
10,  ˆt e ,  ˆt a ,  ˆ
t l  and 
* ˆ
t l ) and four eigenvalues with positive real parts relating to the 
‘jump’ variables in the system ( ˆ() t h p , ˆ() t f p , 
* ˆt c , and  ˆt c ).  
  The first thing to note is that the expression within the square brackets labelled (i), is 
unambiguously negative and does not contain any of the parameters within the policy rules
11. 
Therefore in assessing the determinant condition for stability we need only consider the 
expression within the second square brackets, labelled (ii), which must be negative as a 
necessary condition for saddlepath stability. In this context saddlepath stability implies that all 
variables in the system will return to the steady-state following a temporary fiscal shock – as 
noted above this implies that we are not allowing one government to run a no-Ponzi scheme 
against the other. If we were to allow this then we could simply aggregate the equations 
                                                                 
9 Even if we allowed for seigniorage revenues, for plausible values of  c the stability conditions shown 
here are not materially affected. These more complex conditions are available from the authors upon 
request. The numerical analysis that follows this section allows for non-zero values of  c . 
10 It should be noted that the initial values of real government liabilities and private sector assets, may 
be influenced by any surprise inflation if they are denominated in nominal terms. However, since they 
are not themselves free to jump to any level to eliminate the influence of unstable eigenvalues on the 
dynamic system they should not be considered to be ‘jump’ variables.   17 
across the two economies and reduce the system to a closed economy model of the type 
analysed in Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000). 
 
Compatibility Between Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
 
We can utilise this stability condition to consider how the monetary authorities may 
be constrained by various combinations of member states’ fiscal  policies. The bracketed 
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This inequality can be re-written conditional on various policy parameter combinations as the 
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The first set of inequalities,  (49), capture the policy regimes which are open economy 
versions of Leeper’s (1991) definitions of ‘active’ and ‘passive’ monetary/fiscal policy 
regimes. The second set of inequalities reflect ‘corrections’ to these definitions which emerge 
in the presence of non-Ricardian consumers. This is because (50) can only hold in the case of 
non-Ricardian consumers, since as the probability of death tends to zero, the parameter z 
tends to zero and the real interest rate tends to the rate of time preference. To understand these 
stability conditions more clearly it is helpful to represent them diagrammatically in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 – Compatibility Between Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
 
 
In Figure 1 the x-axis measures the value of  1 r f - , while the y-axis measures, 
*
1 r f - . The 
two hyperbola trace out the combinations of fiscal feedback parameters for which the 
expression labelled (ii) is zero and the global economy is on the cusp of stability/instability,  
given the underlying structural parameters of the model and the monetary policy parameter, 
m
12. The shaded areas in the north-east quadrant, labelled  0 m >  and in the north-west and 
south-east quadrants labelled,  0 m < , represent the combinations of fiscal feedback 
parameters that satisfy the inequalities in (49) conditional on the sign of the monetary policy 
parameter,  m. The non-shaded area labelled  0 m <  represents the combinations of fiscal 
policy parameters, again conditional on  m, which satisfy the set of inequalities in  (50). 
(Recall that this second set of inequalities can only be satisfied in the presence of non-
Ricardian consumers.) The other areas in the diagram, lying inside the lower hyperbola, 
represent combinations of policy parameters which cannot support saddlepath stability
13. 
                                                                 
12 We have drawn the diagram assuming that the value of the asymptote is positive, which seems 
plausible. However, our analysis is not materially affected by assuming the opposite. 
13 Although the two sets of inequalities can, potentially, be satisfied in this region, numerical evaluation 
of the eigenvalues suggests that these are not feasible combinations of policy parameters for reasons 
that are discussed below. 
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We first consider the combinations of fiscal policy which are required to support an 
active monetary policy,  0 m > , as shown by the shaded area in the north-east quadrant. There 
are several features of these stability conditions that are worth emphasising. Firstly, the 
presence of non-Ricardian consumers raises the threshold level of fiscal feedback necessary to 
ensure debt stability when monetary policy is active. In the case of Ricardian consumers the 
requirements for the real debt stock to be bounded would simply be  1 r f >  and 
*
1 r f >  (as in 
Sims (1997))
14 and the non-shaded area in t he north-east quadrant would disappear. This 
would ensure there was no indefinite expansion of the real debt stock in either country and 
that there was no indefinite transfer of wealth from one country to another.
15  
The intuition behind why the presence of non-Ricardian consumers requires larger 
fiscal feedback to stabilise the debt stock is straightforward. Consider a positive shock to debt. 
With non-Ricardian consumers, this will add to net wealth and raise consumption. This will, 
in turn, raise demand and inflation, which with an ‘active’ monetary policy will raise real 
interest rates, aggravating the potential debt-interest spiral. As a result, fiscal feedback has to 
be greater than the steady-state real interest rate since the actual real rate is above steady-state.  
In our model, the conditions for individual debt stability are not only raised above this 
threshold, but they depend upon the fiscal response of other monetary union members as well 
as the ‘activism’ of monetary policy. The solid rectangular hyperbola in the north-east 
quadrant traces the combinations of fiscal feedback that are necessary to ensure that a 
saddlepath-stable rational expectations equilibrium exists with sustainable levels of debt in 
both economies. Therefore, even when we impose the condition that debt in each country 
should be stable, as well as in aggregate, there is scope for compensation between fiscal 
authorities. However, the degree of trade-off is non-linear – any country not doing enough to 
stabilise its debt stock will require a far greater response from the other country to ensure 
bounded real debt stocks in each individual economy. Additionally, there are limits to the 
degree to which one country can compensate another. If one authority has a fiscal response 
which is less than the value of the asymptote,  
                                                                 
14 This condition is stronger than that outlined in Canzoneri et al (2000) where the fiscal authorities 
must simply make some attempt to repay any debt interest which is rolled over from previous periods, 
but this attempt can be arbitrarily small and infrequent. The difference arises since Canzoneri et al (op. 
cit.) wish to define the conditions under which the economy operates under a Ricardian Regime, while 
Sims (op. cit.) gives conditions under which fiscal policy ensures that the real debt stock is bounded 
(for a reconciliation of these two views see Cochrane (1998)). As we are examining the dynamic 
stability of an economy where finite consumer lives imply that debt constitutes an element of net 
wealth, adopting a combination of  monetary and fiscal policy rules which ensure that the real debt 
stock is stabilised is the only way to ensure a dynamically stable economy.  
15 If we were simply interested in the issue of price level determinacy with stability of the aggregate 
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and the monetary authority is ‘actively’ targeting inflation, then it will not be possible for 
another fiscal authority to compensate no matter how great their fiscal response, without 
accumulating the debt of the ‘lax’ fiscal authority. Additionally, as can be seen from the 
dependence of these asymptotes on the monetary policy parameter, m, the greater the degree 
of ‘activism’ in monetary policy the greater the required fiscal response to stabilise the 
respective economies’ debt stocks. Finally, it should be noted that although these are 
necessary, but not necessarily suffic ient conditions, numerical evaluation of the eigenvalues 
of the transition matrix for plausible parameter values suggests that these necessary conditions 
are also sufficient.  
  The next case we consider is the south-west quadrant. Here neither fiscal authority is 
attempting to stabilise its debt stock, or is doing so weakly. However, in this case numerical 
evaluation of the eigenvalues of the transition matrix suggests that even if this policy 
combination can satisfy the inequalities in (49), the economy is never saddlepath stable. The 
intuition is quite straightforward  – a single monetary policy cannot ensure fiscal solvency 
under two independent fiscal authorities when those two authorities both fail to act to stabilise 
their debt stocks. This result also applies in the case of Ricardian consumers and flexible 
prices since a single price level cannot adjust to ensure that the budget constraints of two 
independent fiscal authorities are satisfied (see Canzoneri et al (2001)). We can, therefore, 
ignore this combination of policy parameters in examining stable policy spaces.  
  In the presence of non-Ricardian consumers this policy-space actually extends out of 
the south-west quadrant. If the economy is operating in the non-shaded areas lying below the 
lower hyperbola, then even although one fiscal authority is operating with a fiscal feedback 
parameter,  1 r f >  or 
*
1 r f > , which exceeds the usual stability condition in the case of 
Ricardian consumers, it is still insufficient to stabilise the debt stock when consumers are 
non-Ricardian. Essentially, both fiscal authorities remain unable to stabilise their debt stocks.  
  We can also examine the case where the monetary authority is able to compensate for 
a weak fiscal response on the part of one fiscal authority by operating a ‘passive’ monetary 
policy. This is given by the areas lying between the two hyperbola. Here one fiscal authority 
is acting to stabilise its debt stock. The other fiscal authority then has to act to ensure debt 
stability on its own – as noted above the monetary authority cannot act to stabilise the debt of 
two imprudent authorities. It is also interesting to note that when one fiscal authority’s path 
for debt is only mildly unstable then the prudent fiscal authority has to have a very large 
degree of fiscal feedback to ensure saddlepath stability.    21 
This analysis suggests that we can identify two underlying policy regimes. Firstly, for 
monetary policy to be able to adjust nominal interest rates such that real rates are free to rise 
in response to excess inflation then it is necessary for each fiscal authority to be adjusting 
their fiscal instruments to ensure the value of its  real debt stock is bounded. Within this 
regime there can be some degree of compensation between fiscal authorities, in that a 
moderate fiscal response on the part of one fiscal authority will not compromise the ECB’s 
attempts to target inflation if another fiscal authority is sufficiently aggressive in stabilising its 
stock of government liabilities. 
  The second regime we can identify, is where one fiscal authority does not meet the 
critical degree of fiscal feedback needed to stabilise its debt stock when  the ECB gears 
monetary policy towards the control of inflation. In this case the ECB must abandon its 
attempt to ‘actively’ control inflation and adopt a monetary policy which will not destabilise 
the debt stock of the recalcitrant fiscal authority. The remaining fiscal authorities must act to 
stabilise their own liabilities – it would only be possible for the ECB to assist more than one 
fiscal authority if their policies, their economies and the shocks hitting them were perfectly 
symmetrical. Any other combination of policy is unsustainable in that there would be 
indefinite transfers of wealth between union members.  
 
3.Calibration and Simulation of the Model: 
 
  In order to discuss the policy implications for different degrees of fiscal rectitude 
under a common monetary policy, we need to adopt parameter values for our model. We 
assume that a unit of time corresponds to a quarterly data period. Accordingly, the parameters 
we choose are given in Table 1, along with the steady-state values these imply.  
 
Table 1 – Parameters and Steady-State  
Parameter  Value  Variable  Steady-
State 
Value 
Steady-State Value as 
percentage of annual 
GDP 
q  8  y   0.5  100% 
s   0.007  r (annualised)  0.03  N.A. 
k  0.0083  h   23.42  1123% 
t   0.125  al =   1.4  70% 
a   0.287  c   0.37  77% 
k   1.136  g   0.115  23% 
c   0.001  m   0.05  2.7%   22 
 
The value of the elasticity of demand facing our imperfectly competitive firms,  q , comes 
from the econometric work of Rotemberg and Woodford (1998).  The continuously 
compounding quarterly discount rate of  0.007  is slightly lower than that implied by other 
studies (such as Kollman (1998) or Rotemberg and Woodford op. cit., for example). The 
reason for this is that these studies assume infinitely lived consumers so that their implied 
continuously compounding rate of 0.00747 is equivalent to an annualised real interest rate of 
around 3%. Since the existence of finite lives in our model raises the real rate of interest 
above consumers’ rate of time preference, this slightly lower rate of time preference is 
consistent with the same equilibrium real interest rate.  
  The k parameter is the probability of death for our consumers. This value implies that 
consumers have an expected working life of 30 years. Although this may be thought to imply 
an implausible value for the probability of death, it is necessary to generate a plausible steady-
state value of government debt relative to GDP – the implied debt to GDP ratio of 70% is the 
same as for the Euro area in 2000 (ECB (2001)). This mark-up can be justified as reflecting 
uncertainty not formally captured in our model. For example, Faruqee et al (1997), show that 
taking the probability of death story literally implies near Ricardian consumption behaviour. 
They then show that extending the model to allow for non-monotonic life-time earnings 
profiles effectively raises the interest rate mark-up in the equation for aggregate human 
wealth in a manner consistent with our calibrated parameter. 
t is our level of lump sum taxation and implies that tax revenues are 25% of GDP. 
The k  parameter is chosen such that consumers devote 50% of their waking hours to leisure 
and 50% to work. While the parameter a  measures the instantaneous probability that a firm 
will be able to reset its price. Therefore, 
1
a
 measures the average length of time between 




= , means that it takes, on average, 10.5 months for firms to 
reset prices. This figure sits half way between the 3 quarter (see Rotemberg and Woodford 
(1997), for example) and 1 year (see Erceg et al (2001)) expected contract lengths commonly 
adopted in the literature. It is also consistent with econometric estimates of this parameter for 
the Euro area in Gali et al (2001) and Leith and Malley (2001).  
  We consider two values for m, the coefficient on excess inflation in the Taylor rule. 
The first value of m of 0.5 is widely used in studies of interest rate reaction functions; see 
Taylor (1993) for example. We contrast this with a value of -0.5 – this implies a monetary 
policy which only adjusts nominal interest rates by half the rise in inflation such that real rates 
fall. Finally, we assume, that the parameter governing the importance of money in utility is 
0.001, implying that the stock of government liabilities issued in the form of cash or deposits   23 
is 2.7% of GDP, relative to overall government liabilities of 70% of GDP. Again these figures 
are consistent with the Euro area at the end of 2000 (ECB (2001)). This parameterisation, 
therefore allows a small role for seigniorage revenues in the analysis that follows. 
  The steady-state these parameters imply is shown in the right-hand-side of the table. 
The real interest rate has an annualised value of around 3%, and the steady-state ratio of debt 
to GDP is around 70%, which is consistent with figures for the Euro area economies. The 
ratio of government spending to GDP of j ust under 25% is also typical of European 
economies if you eliminate transfers from the definition of government spending to be left 
with government consumption as defined in our model (see Gali (1994), for a comparison of 
this ratio across OECD economies). 
  We can now consider the implications of our stability analysis given the assumed 
parameters of our model. Numerical evaluation of the stability conditions detailed above, 
indicate that if both fiscal authorities ran policies such that  1 0.008 f >  and 
*
1 0.008 f >  (i.e. 
for every one Euro of debt disequilibrium taxes have to adjust by at least 0.008 Euros) then 
the monetary authorities would be free to actively target inflation. If one fiscal authority failed 
to meet this level of fiscal feedback then the other may be able to compensate for their 
behaviour, although only in the range of 
*
1 0.007730.008 f << , such that the monetary 
authority could still run an ‘active’ monetary policy. In other words, although there is the 
theoretical possibility of one fiscal authority compensating for the lax fiscal behaviour of 
another, the range over which this is possible is very small, and could require a very large 
fiscal response on the part of the compensating authority. Since the minimum degree of fiscal 
feedback required of each authority is relatively low it seems far more likely that the only 
sustainable policy space is if both fiscal authorities act to fulfil this condition leaving the 




In this section we analyse the paths of aggregate variables in our two economies in 
the face of shocks under various descriptions of policy. The shock we consider is a fiscal 
shock which raises the real value of debt by 10%, cet. par
16. Figure 2 gives the paths for 
inflation, consumption and debt when monetary policy actively targets inflation, such that 
m=0.5, and the fiscal authorities act to stabilise debt in accordance with fiscal feedback 
parameters of 
*
11 0.1 ff == . In other words, given the steady-state implied by our assumed 
model parameters, they raise tax revenues by 1% for every 1% increase in their liabilities 
                                                                 
16 To the extent that the governments’ liabilities are denominated in nominal terms, any surprise 
inflation as a result of the shock may result in the initial increase in debt being different from 10%.   24 
relative to their steady-state values. Since the economies and the shock hitting them is 
symmetrical, there is no distinction between the paths of variables in country 1 and 2.  
  The main thing to note about these results is that even although consumers are non-
Ricardian, and discount the future far more heavily that an infinitely-lived consumer would, 
this still has a negligible impact on consumption and inflation due to the ‘active’ response of 
monetary policy. The initial impact on inflation is only 0.008% and consumption only rises by 
0.005%. In this simulation debt was assumed to be fully indexed. However, when debt is 
denominated in nominal terms the surprise inflation associated with the fiscal shock serves to 
reduce the initial increase in the real value of debt. However, the increase in inflation is so 
small that the effects are negligible.  
  We can then contrast these simulations with an example of our ‘passive’ regime. 
Specifically, we assume that the fiscal authority in country 2 refuses to adjust tax revenues in 
the face of debt disequilibrium i.e. 
*
1 0 f = . The monetary authority is then forced to adopt a 
monetary policy that will ensure debt stability in country 2 – we assume m=-0.5. Finally, the 
fiscal authority in country 1 acts prudently with a fiscal feedback parameter of 0.1. Figure 3 
reveals the paths of inflation, consumption and government liabilities in both countries when 
government debt is fully indexed and when it is nominal. In these cases the impact of the 
same fiscal shock on inflation and consumption is far more significant – inflation rises by 
almost 6% on impact and consumption by almost 10% when debt is fully indexed, and by 
almost 4% and 7%, respectively when debt is nominal. The reason is that the ECB’s ‘passive’ 
monetary policy does not raise real interest rates in response to excess inflation as this would 
lead to a debt interest spiral in country 2. This loosening of monetary policy, boosts the 
discounted value of human wealth which increases consumption. Given the nominal inertia in 
the two economies this will feed through into both higher consumption and inflation. The 
paths for government debt in the two economies are slightly different  – the active fiscal 
feedback in country 1 stabilises the debt stock more quickly, while using monetary policy to 
stabilise the debt stock in country two leads to liabilities actually falling below target after 1 
½ years. It should also be noted that the different fiscal policies also imply different paths for 
consumption and inflation in the two economies – consumers in country 1 suffer an increase 
in taxation which consumers in country 2 avoid. However, as was seen in Figure 2 the impact 
on aggregate demand of debt, even with this degree of non-Ricardian behaviour, is negligible, 
and is difficult to discern from the graphs.  
Figure 3, also contains the paths for variables when debt is denominated in nominal 
terms. Here, the initial increase in debt is almost halved as a result of the surprise inflation 
induced by the fiscal shock. This is essentially the mechanism underlying the Fiscal Theory of 
the Price Level  – if prices were fully flexible then the fiscal shock could be completely   25 
eliminated by a one-off jump in the price level. However, in the presence of nominal inertia, 
not all prices are free to jump to eliminate the fiscal disequilibrium. As a result, the monetary 
authorities still need to act ‘passively’ to avoid an explosive path for debt in country 2, 
although the initial surprise inflation has made their job much easier. Therefore, real interest 
rates need not fall by as much, and the slacker monetary policy does not feed consumption 
and inflation to the same extent. 
  These results suggest that it is desirable to ensure that the monetary union is in the 
active monetary policy regime, but that modest fiscal feedback is sufficient to insure that debt 
disequilibrium does not have a significant impact on inflation. What would be the 
consequence of one economy stabilising debt much more rapidly, while adjustment in the 
other economy remained modest? If the modest response of one fiscal authority imposed 
significant costs on the other economy, then this may serve as a rationale for the Pact for 
Stability and Growth. To answer this question, the final simulations we consider are the case 
of the ECB engaged in the fight against inflation, m=0.5, while the fiscal authority in country 
1 targets its debt stock with the fiscal feedback parameter  1 0.1 f = , but country 2 employs an 
extremely aggressive fiscal policy, 
*
1 9.4 f = , adjusting tax revenues by 100% for every 1% 
deviation of public liabilities from their steady-state value. Figure 4 details the paths of 
inflation, consumption, government liabilities and private sector financial wealth in the face 
of the same fiscal shock. Again the magnitude of the changes in consumption and inflation are 
very small for the reasons discussed above. The strong fiscal response in country 2 means that 
its debt stock is returned to steady-state very quickly. In country 1 the response is more 
gradual. This means that consumption in country 1 is given a greater boost due to the relative 
delay in fiscal correction there. As this increase in aggregate demand in country 1 feeds into 
demand for products in both economies prices rise in both economies. The ECB responds by 
raising real interest rates, which partially offsets the rise in consumption in country 1 and 
actually reduces consumption in country 2. The initial price increase in country 1 is greater 
than in country 2 as workers in country 1 require greater wage increases to supply their labour 
as they now wish to substitute their higher consumption for leisure. The path for private sector 
financial assets reflects the path for government liabilities, although there is some difference 
in the medium run as terms of trade effects result in consumers in country 1 holding some of 
the debt of country 2. Thus, although different speeds of debt correction lead to differences in 
response between countries, the overall impact on inflation is small. This model does not 
imply that the enforcement of rapid correction of debt disequilibrium is necessary to stabilise 
inflation in a monetary union. 
   26 
4.Conclusions  
 
In this paper we constructed a two country model which contained a number features 
which broke the distinction between Ricardian and non-Ricardian policies highlighted by the 
FTPL. Specifically, our two economies featured overlapping generations of consumers who 
did not expect to live forever – as a result the government’s liabilities (money and bonds) 
constitute an element of net wealth and their level will affect real interest rates in our 
economies. These consumers then supplied labour to imperfectly competitive firms who sold 
their output at home and abroad. These imperfectly competitive firms could only adjust their 
prices at random intervals. The combination of non-Ricardian consumers, and the nominal 
inertia facing imperfectly competitive firms implied that both monetary and fiscal policy 
could have real and nominal effects in both countries.  
  We then analysed the restrictions on policy necessary to ensure that our economies 
were saddlepath stable. In the context of the dynamic system analysed this implies that these 
restrictions would deliver a fully determined path for prices and would also prevent indefinite 
transfers of wealth from one economy to the other. Despite the complexity of the model we 
were able to derive a number of analytical results. First, the degree of fiscal response running 
from government debt to taxation required to ensure that the real debt stock is bounded is 
higher in the presence of non-Ricardian consumers. Second, we were able to identify two 
underlying policy regimes consistent with a fully determined path of prices and stable stocks 
of debt in both economies. In the first regime the monetary authorities implement a common 
monetary policy which raises nominal interest rates, such that real interest rates rise in 
response to excess inflation. This ‘active’ targeting of inflation requires the fiscal authorities 
to act to stabilise their liabilities. However, it was possible for one fiscal authority to 
compensate, to some extent, for a relatively weak fiscal response on the part of another 
monetary union member. In the second policy regime, one fiscal authority did not act to 
stabilise its liabilities, and the other fiscal authority was unable to compensate for this 
behaviour without transferring the wealth of its citizens abroad. In this regime, the only way 
to stabilise debt in both economies is for the monetary authority to abandon its ‘active’ 
targeting of inflation such that increases in inflation will reduce real interest rates and stabilise 
the debt in the country which runs an otherwise destabilising fiscal policy. The remaining 
fiscal authorities must then ensure that their fiscal policies stabilise their respective real debt 
stocks. Finally, we calibrated the model and generated a plausible steady-state. We found, for 
plausible parameter values, that the scope for one fiscal authority to compensate for weak 
correction on the part of the other was very limited. However, the degree of fiscal feedback 
required to ensure a stable path for the real debt stock was not very onerous. It also suggested 
that differences in the speed of fiscal correction, once this critical rate was reached, are not   27 
material in affecting the paths of macroeconomic variables in the face of shocks. However, 
when we moved to the regime where the monetary authorities are forced to abandon the 
active targeting of inflation, then the impact of fiscal shocks on inflation and output were now 
significant. It was also shown that having government debt denominated in nominal terms 
allowed surprise inflation to eliminate a significant part of any debt disequilibrium so that 
monetary policy had less to do in this respect.    28 
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Appendix 1 – Log-Linearising the Mode l 
 
  We now proceed to log-linearise the model around the symmetrical steady-state. To 









k -=  (52) 
 
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides, differentiating with respect to time and evaluating 
this expression at the symmetrical steady-state yields, 
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This approach can be applied to all the equations in our model.  
  Next, consider the linearised expression for the optimal price set by a home firm, (18)
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Log-linearising the expression for the index of home country output prices, (19), gives, 
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Differentiating with respect to time, 
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This is the same as the usual New Keynesian Philips curve, except that there now exists a 
terms of trade-effect in addition to the usual output gap effect. A similar expression can be 
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  We can then eliminate the terms of trade from the each country’s Philips curve by 
noting the log-linearised definition of average home firm output, 
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and average foreign firm output, 
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Combining these expressions, using the definition the definition of PPP, and the global goods 







+=+++ , allows us to rewrite the 
home and foreign economy’s Phillips curve as equations (31) and (32), respectively. 
  Log-linearising the domestic government’s budget constraint, (23) yields, 
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If we assume, for simplicity, that the monetary authority distributes any seigniorage revenues 
equally between both fiscal authorities then we can rewrite this as equation (39) in the main 
text, with equation (40) being the corresponding equation for the foreign economy.  
  In our open economy the evolution of private sector financial assets in the home 
country is given by, 
 
  (1) tttttt daracy ct =-++-   (65) 
 
Log-linearising yields equation (37) above. 
Now we turn to the consumption function, equation  (11). Differentiating this with 
respect to time gives, 
 
  ()() ttt dckdadh s =++   (66)  
 






=--+ ￿￿ , and 
() ttttt dhrkhyt =+-+. Using the equations of motion for human and non-human wealth 
allows us to requite the equation of motion for consumption as, 
 
  (()(1))() tttt dcrkkckka scs =+-++-+   (67)  
 
This is the usual consumption Euler equation, adjusted for holdings of money balances and 
allowing for the possibility that finites lives mean that government debt constitutes and 
element in net wealth. This can be log-linearised to give the Euler equations for consumption 
for the home and foreign economies - equations (35) and (36), respectively.   34 
 
Appendix 2 – Simulation Results
17 
 
Figure 2: ‘Active’ Monetary Policy   Figure 3 ‘Passive’ Monetary Policy with  








                                                                 
17 Inflation is measured as a percentage, and all other variables are measured as a percentage deviations 
from steady-state. Dotted lines refer to solution values when debt is nominal, and solid lines refer to 
simulations where debt is fully indexed. In the final chart, diamonds denote country two. In all other 
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